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Prof. McQuoid-Mason responds: I can understand the somewhat 
emotional response to my article, illustrated by the sentence ‘that 
only one component of the legal definition spares us from being 
labelled criminals’. The real reason doctors are not held legally liable 
for murder when they withdraw or withhold treatment in futile cases, 
or hasten death through the prescription of certain drugs, is because 
their conduct is not unlawful – not because they do not intend the 
patient to die or did not cause the death of the patient.
As I said in my article,[1] all four elements for murder (the element 
referring to a human being is not usually in dispute) have to be 
satisfied – if the unlawfulness element is missing, there is no crime.
This is not unusual for other areas of medical practice. For instance, 
cutting a person open during an operation is a serious assault (the 
surgeon causes injury to the patient’s body), but it is not unlawful 
if the patient consented to the procedure, or it if it is an emergency 
situation where the patient is unable to give consent.
Muckart et al.’s contention that ‘in addition to the lack of 
unlawfulness, neither intent nor causation applies’ does not hold 
in terms of the law. Surely a doctor who orders that life support 
treatment is withheld or withdrawn, or prescribes a drug that lessens 
a person’s life expectancy, knows that their omission or conduct 
will hasten the patient’s death? Legally this knowledge amounts to 
eventual intention. Likewise, death will follow either immediately or 
later, the underlying illness or injury taking over, and the conduct 
of the doctor contributes to the death of the patient by allowing 
such condition to take over. This satisfies the legal requirement of 
causation for the reasons set out in the article.
The suggestion that there ‘is a major difference between intentional 
killing, albeit out of altruism, and allowing death to occur as a direct 
consequence of the inciting disease or injury in the presence of non-
beneficial treatment’ is recognised by the law, which states that such 
conduct is not unlawful – even though the other elements of murder 
may be present.
The concern about part 1 of paragraph 77 in Section G of the Notice 
of Death/Still Birth could be met by adopting what was quoted from 
Mason and McCall Smith at the end of my article: ‘Lawful withdrawal 
of life support systems which were necessitated by [the disease]’.[2] This 
would be the technically accurate manner of recording the death – with 
suitable adjustments for the nature of the injury or illness. However, it 
may be that the current practice is acceptable to the Registrar of Births 
and Deaths and the other relevant authorities.
The example of the two cases of patients with traumatic brain injury 
and a large extradural haematoma ‘compares apples with oranges’. The 
death of the patient in the remote rural area ‘before transfer to definitive 
care’ may be directly due to the injuries without any intervention by 
healthcare professionals, unless the death was due to some negligent act 
or omission by them, so the latter did not cause the death. In the case 
of the patient who is given ‘immediate access to a neurosurgical unit’, 
the healthcare professionals concerned have placed the patient on life 
support to keep him/her alive. When they withdraw the support they 
hasten the death of the patient because further treatment is futile, but 
their conduct is not unlawful. The ‘legal perspective’ does not change, 
because in both situations the death may be lawful.
I agree that ‘passive euthanasia’ is an oxymoron, for the reasons set 
out in the article, but it is a widely used term for lawful euthanasia. 
The definition of euthanasia suggested by Muckart et al. fails to deal 
with the question of causation and the objectives aimed at ending 
pain or suffering. However, there is some merit in adopting an 
amended version of the current definition of ‘active euthanasia’ as a 
definition of ‘euthanasia’ proper, without subdividing it into ‘active’ 
and ‘passive’. Thus, the definition could read: ‘Euthanasia occurs where 
a person with the actual intention to kill unlawfully causes the death 
of a terminally ill patient to end pain or suffering.’ This definition 
is consistent with that of murder, in that it includes intention, 
unlawfulness and causation, but is modified to include the elements of 
‘actual intention’, which excludes ‘eventual intention’, and the objective 
‘to end pain and suffering’ that is associated with euthanasia.
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Palliative care:  
Preventing misconceptions
To the Editor: McQuoid-Mason’s statement that ‘Doctors who 
hasten the termination of the lives of their patients by withholding 
or withdrawing treatment or prescribing a potentially fatal palliative 
dose of medication satisfy the elements of intention and causation 
of a charge of murder against them’[1] is of great concern. It 
highlights a disconnect between the professions of law and medicine 
and misconceptions regarding the practice of palliative care. Such 
statements influence professional and public perceptions and create 
barriers to patient and family access to quality end-of-life care that 
focuses on relief of suffering and improving quality of life.
The World Health Organization definition of palliative care 
includes affirming life, regards dying as a normal process, and intends 
neither to hasten nor postpone death. The palliative care approach 
aims to improve quality of life and assist patients to live as actively as 
possible. It may aim to prolong life where there is expectation of fair 
quality of life, but not to prolong dying. Clinical skill and experience 
assist the doctor and the palliative care team in identifying where 
quality of life can be improved and when patients are dying without 
likelihood of improvement.
Excluding those who die suddenly, many people are under medical 
care when they die. Doctors do not cause the death, which results from 
the disease process. When treatment is futile, is refused or has no benefit, 
it should not be given just because treatment is available. ‘Consideration 
of withholding or withdrawing treatment as a sound clinical decision 
developed as a consequence of the availability of advanced medical 
technology and the resultant ability to prolong life that in some cases is 
in fact unwanted prolongation of the dying process.’[2]
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Focusing on death, which is common to end-of-life care and to 
euthanasia, is ‘a reductionist philosophy that does not reflect clinical 
reality’.[3] Euthanasia is an active intervention intending to cause the 
person’s death. Palliative care advises that the decision to withhold or 
withdraw treatment should only be taken after careful consideration 
by the care team and discussion with the patient (if competent) and 
the family. Withholding or withdrawing treatment is a sound clinical 
decision under these circumstances. The statement that the doctor 
‘legally has the eventual intention to kill the patient’[1] highlights the 
disconnect between the legal and medical professions on this point, 
and lack of understanding of clinical reality.
It is a misconception that ‘prescribing a potentially fatal palliative 
dose of medication’[1] is part of medical practice, in particular palliative 
care. Responsible prescribing of medicine by doctors is reinforced in 
palliative medicine training, where doctors use sedatives and analgesics, 
titrating the dose to the patient’s response so that the symptoms are 
controlled without threatening the patient’s life. This misconception 
stems from the ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’ first described by Thomas 
Aquinas in the 13th century. Advances in medical knowledge and 
skill enable doctors to provide quality care without shortening life. 
Palliative care integrated into cancer care can increase life expectancy.[4] 
That using opioids or sedatives may shorten life is a myth; ‘there is no 
evidence that the use of opioids or sedatives in palliative care requires 
the doctrine of double effect as a defence’, and ‘although the doctrine 
is a valid ethical device, it is, for the most part, irrelevant to symptom 
control at the end of life. To exaggerate its involvement perpetuates a 
myth that satisfactory symptom control at the end of life is inevitably 
associated with hastening death. The result can be reluctance to use 
medication to secure comfort and failure to provide adequate relief to a 
deeply vulnerable group of patients.’[5]
The Hospice Palliative Care Association of South Africa urges 
doctors to improve their knowledge and skills in palliative care 
and pain management, and to refer patients to hospice, or to a 
palliative care or pain service if they lack the knowledge and skills 
to address their patient’s suffering. Legal and ethics specialists must 
also update their understanding of palliative care and not perpetuate 
misconceptions that deprive patients of quality palliative care.
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Prof. McQuoid-Mason responds: Gwyther’s ‘great concern’ about the 
fact that two of the four elements necessary for a charge of murder 
may be satisfied is understandable, but unfounded. The law is clear 
– unless all four elements are satisfied there is no question of a crime 
or a civil wrong being perpetrated (see my example in ‘Definition of 
euthanasia’ above, concerning surgeons in the operating theatre).
I do not understand the statement that ‘Such statements influence 
professional and public perceptions and create barriers to patient 
and family access to quality end-of-life care that focuses on relief 
of suffering and improving quality of life.’ Surely doctors explain 
to patients and their families that when treatment is withheld or 
withdrawn in cases of futility, it will hasten the patient’s death and 
not prolong their dying? The doctors know that their act or omission 
will allow the underlying condition to cause death, but that they are 
protected by the law because their conduct is regarded as lawful; they 
may have what the law calls ‘eventual intention’, but their conduct is 
not unlawful. This is because the law recognises that, in Gwyther’s 
words, ‘When treatment is futile, is refused or has no benefit, it 
should not be given just because treatment is available.’ There is no 
disconnect between the law and medicine on this point, as the law 
regards such conduct as lawful.
I stand corrected if it is a ‘misconception’ that the drugs used in 
palliative may reduce a patient’s life expectancy, and in Gwyther’s 
words, that ‘symptoms are controlled without threatening the patient’s 
life’. However, the principle regarding the hastening death might apply 
in other situations – unless such treatment is also no longer practised. 
Presumably, in the past, when certain drugs did reduce a patient’s life 
expectancy this was fully explained to patients (and to their families) 
to ensure that such conduct was lawful.
I agree with Gwyther’s statement that ‘Legal and ethics specialists 
must also update their understanding of palliative care and not 
perpetuate misconceptions that deprive patients of quality palliative 
care.’ I also agree with the statement by Mason and McCall Smith that 
prompted me to write the article and is quoted at the end: ‘When, 
however, a treatment is discontinued solely by reason of its futility, 
there is nothing to be lost – and much to be gained by intellectual 
honesty – in attributing death, correctly, to “Lawful withdrawal of life 
support systems which were necessitated by [the disease]”.’[1]
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WHIDMT: Rossouw and Howard 
blatantly miss the point
To the Editor: Rossouw and Howard’s response[1] to my article[2] 
confirms that it is they and not I who miss the point.
My key focus[2] was not whether the Women’s Health Initiative 
Dietary Modification Trial (WHIDMT) supports the use of 
carbohydrate-restricted diets. Nor did my key points focus ‘on 
subgroup findings rather than the robust overall findings’ of the 
study. By introducing these arguments, Rossouw and Howard[1] neatly 
sidestep the single most important question I raised.
I wished to understand why these authors have yet to communicate 
the sole significant finding of the WHIDMT, which is that women 
with established heart disease at the start of the trial fared worse if 
they changed to the low-fat ‘prudent’ diet than did those equally ill 
women who continued to eat a supposedly unhealthy diet. I also 
showed that the key finding in their Fig. 3[3] is unintelligible because 
an essential line of text is missing, and furthermore that no reference 
is made to Fig. 3 in their response.[1]
Instead they dismiss the only significant finding in their study 
as ‘likely to be a chance finding’ because ‘there is no biologic basis 
for expecting a different outcome in this [ill] subgroup, as shown 
in cholesterol-lowering trials of women with prior disease’.[1] An 
inconvenient outcome is therefore ignored because of their certainty 
that this adverse result has no (currently known) biological basis. 
